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Abstract
The ASVspoof challenge series was born to spearhead
research in anti-spoofing for automatic speaker verification
(ASV). The two challenge editions in 2015 and 2017 involved
the assessment of spoofing countermeasures (CMs) in isolation
from ASV using an equal error rate (EER) metric. While a
strategic approach to assessment at the time, it has certain short-
comings. First, the CM EER is not necessarily a reliable predic-
tor of performance when ASV and CMs are combined. Second,
the EER operating point is ill-suited to user authentication ap-
plications, e.g. telephone banking, characterised by a high target
user prior but a low spoofing attack prior. We aim to migrate
from CM- to ASV-centric assessment with the aid of a new
tandem detection cost function (t-DCF) metric. It extends the
conventional DCF used in ASV research to scenarios involving
spoofing attacks. The t-DCF metric has 6 parameters: (i) false
alarm and miss costs for both systems, and (ii) prior probabil-
ities of target and spoof trials (with an implied third, nontar-
get prior). The study is intended to serve as a self-contained,
tutorial-like presentation. We analyse with the t-DCF a selec-
tion of top-performing CM submissions to the 2015 and 2017
editions of ASVspoof, with a focus on the spoofing attack prior.
Whereas there is little to choose between countermeasure sys-
tems for lower priors, system rankings derived with the EER
and t-DCF show differences for higher priors. We observe some
ranking changes. Findings support the adoption of the DCF-
based metric into the roadmap for future ASVspoof challenges,
and possibly for other biometric anti-spoofing evaluations.
1. Introduction
It has long been known that biometric recognition systems are
vulnerable to manipulation through spoofing, also known as
presentation attack detection [1]. Some of the earliest work
in anti-spoofing was published almost two decades ago [2, 3].
Since then, a number of common evaluation or challenges have
emerged, e.g. in fingerprint recognition [4] and face recogni-
tion [5]. The ASVspoof challenge series was born to spear-
head research in anti-spoofing for automatic speaker verifica-
tion (ASV).
Common datasets prepared for the two ASVspoof chal-
lenges in 2015 and 2017 were accompanied with common pro-
tocols and evaluation metrics. Motivated by the need to build in-
terest and momentum in anti-spoofing research, the ASVspoof
challenges have focused on the assessment of countermeasure
technologies in isolation from ASV. This approach to assess-
ment offered a low cost of entry and helped to attract researchers
from outside of the speaker recognition research community;
participation was not dependent on experience in speaker recog-
nition. According to the same strategy, the chosen evaluation
metric was the standard equal error rate (EER) of a spoofing
attack detection module.
The ASVspoof challenge series has developed into what is
arguably now the most successful of all biometric anti-spoofing
challenges: the ASVspoof 2015 database hosted on the Ed-
inburgh DataShare1 has attracted the greatest number of page
views over the academic year 2016-17; well over 150 down-
load requests were received for the 2017 database; almost 50
participants submitted results to the 2017 evaluation. Even if
the simplicity of the challenges may have been instrumental to
their success, improvements to the evaluation strategy, and met-
ric in particular, have been planned for since long before the
first challenge [6].
While there are compelling reasons to pursue evaluation in
isolation from ASV, this strategy is sub-optimal in the longer
term. While spoofing countermeasures and ASV solve different
tasks — an argument which may support the former approach to
evaluation — they are but sub-systems of a single system with a
common overarching goal. The performance of a spoofing de-
tector naturally impacts on the performance of the ASV system;
it will influence not just the false alarm rate, but also the miss
rate [7], meaning that it will impact on reliability and usabil-
ity. Accordingly, there is no guarantee that a better-performing
countermeasure (lower EER) will deliver more reliable ASV
performance. In summary, with progress in anti-spoofing re-
search continuing at a pace, metrics must evolve to reflect the
performance of the system as a whole.
Ideally, such a new metric would bridge the gap between the
anti-spoofing and ASV communities while maintaining support
for countermeasure research in isolation from ASV; even if the
goal of improving ASV reliability is common to both, spoof-
ing countermeasures and ASV sub-system still have different
specific goals. Such a new metric should, however, reflect the
impact of spoofing countermeasures on subsequent verification
with intuitive, interpretable results, providing for the reliable
ranking of competing countermeasure solutions. Such a new
metric should also remain independent to the form of spoofing
attack (e.g. replay, voice conversion, speech synthesis).
There is one additional requirement in that such a met-
ric should reflect the impact of spoofing countermeasures in a
Bayes sense. Not all spoofing attacks are equal. Let us imagine
1https://datashare.is.ed.ac.uk/handle/10283/
2778
Table 1: Possible joint actions in a parallel integration of countermeasure (CM) and automatic speaker verification (ASV) and their
associated false rejection (miss) and false acceptance rates. See Fig. 1 for the explanation of the three different types of systems.
Type of trial (prior probability)
Target Nontarget Spoof
System (CM action, ASV action) (pitar) (pinon) (pispoof)
(i)
(ACCEPT, REJECT) (a) miss OK OK
(ACCEPT, ACCEPT) OK (b) false accept (c) false accept
(REJECT, SLEEP) (d) miss OK OK
(ii)
(SLEEP, REJECT) miss OK OK
(ACCEPT, ACCEPT) OK false accept false accept
(REJECT, ACCEPT) miss OK OK
(iii)
(ACCEPT, REJECT) miss OK OK
(ACCEPT, ACCEPT) OK false accept false accept
(REJECT, REJECT) miss OK OK
(REJECT, ACCEPT) miss OK OK
(ii)
(iii)
(i)
CM ASV
CM
ASV REJECT
REJECT
ACCEPT
ACCEPT
REJECT
ACCEPT
SLEEP
ACCEPT
REJECT
ASV
ACCEPT
REJECT
CM REJECT
ACCEPT
SLEEP
Figure 1: This work addresses performance assessment of a
combined system consisting of an automatic speaker verifica-
tion (ASV) module and a ‘plug-and-play’ spoofing countermea-
sure (CM) that are combined either (i) CM followed by ASV,
(ii) ASV followed by CM, or (iii) in parallel. The combined
system is subjected to benchmarking using speech utterances
from three different types of users: targets, nontargets and at-
tackers.
a ‘poor’ spoofing attack which closely resembles a zero-effort
impostor attack. Such an attack would resemble high quality,
natural speech and would likely be missed by a spoofing coun-
termeasure. Assuming an ASV system of high quality, such an
attack will ultimately fail since the trial does not resemble the
target speaker. In this sense, that the spoofing countermeasure
misses the attack implies little cost. Conversely, a high quality
spoofing attack which fools the ASV system with near certainly
implies a high cost should it be missed by the spoofing counter-
measure. An improved metric should therefore reflect the cost
of decisions in a Bayes / minimum risk sense.
A solution which satisfies all of these requirements can be
derived from the detection cost function (DCF) framework [8]
endorsed since 1996 by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) within the scope of the speaker recognition
evaluation (SRE) campaigns [9]. The adoption of standard cor-
pora and DCF metric as the primary means of unbiased assess-
ment of ASV performance has been instrumental to progress in
the field. Key to the DCF is the specification of costs for miss-
ing target users and falsely accepting impostors (nontarget) in
addition to the prior probabilities of each. Costs specify a loss
in money, reputation, user dissatisfaction or other similar con-
sequences upon the making of incorrect decisions. The speci-
fication of costs and priors tailors the DCF metric towards the
development of ASV technologies for a range of different appli-
cations. The costs and priors could indeed be very different in
surveillance and forensics compared to authentication applica-
tions, such as e-banking or home control. The costs and priors
have varied across the different NIST SRE campaigns but the
underlying DCF framework has remained the same. The NIST
SREs have focused on applications with low target user priors,
reflective of surveillance or speaker indexing applications.
Despite its generality, and for two reasons, the NIST DCF is
not readily applicable to scenarios that involve spoofing attacks.
First, there is a need to augment the user set (targets and nontar-
gets) with an additional spoofing impostor set. Spoofing impos-
tors are neither targets nor nontargets (zero-effort impostors);
they require specific treatment. Second, the standard DCF is de-
signed for the assessment of a single ASV system, whereas this
paper is concerned with the assessment of ASV systems that are
combined with spoofing countermeasures (CM) (Fig. 1). Each
system addresses different detection tasks and thus it is nec-
essary to determine how their individual detection error rates
combine upon the decisions made by both systems in the face
of each user type (Table 1). This is the goal of the proposed
tandem detection cost function (t-DCF). It is a generalisation
of the standard NIST DCF under the same risk analysis frame-
work that supports the evaluation of combined ASV and spoof-
ing countermeasures.
The study reported in this paper is intended to serve as a
self-contained tutorial-like presentation including a treatment
of the traditional DCF. In order to investigate the merit of the
new t-DCF, we examine differences in the ranking of systems
submitted to the both of the ASVspoof challenge editions when
the ranking is determined using (i) the performance of spoofing
countermeasures assessed in isolation using the original EER
metric, and (ii) the proposed DCF-based approach which re-
flects the performance of spoofing countermeasures combined
with a common ASV system. If the differences in ranking are
shown to be negligible, then the current approach to isolated
countermeasure assessment may be satisfactory. In contrast,
pronounced differences between rankings would support adop-
tion of the proposed DCF-based approach into the roadmap for
future ASVspoof challenges.
2. Automatic speaker verification, spoofing
countermeasures and their combination
This section describes the functions of automatic speaker veri-
fication (ASV) and spoofing countermeasure (CM) systems in
addition to the manner in which they can be combined.
2.1. Problem formulation
ASV systems aim to verify the correspondence between speak-
ers in two different speech utterances. The first forms the en-
rollment utterance and is processed to form a speaker model,
whereas the second is provided during testing in the form of a
trial. As illustrated in Fig. 1, three different trials may be en-
countered: (1) target, (2) nontarget and (3) spoofing impostor.
Only target trials should be positively verified. Both forms of
impostor trial should be rejected.
While nontargets and spoofing impostors may be grouped
together into one class, there are reasons to consider three dis-
tinct classes. ASV systems are generally designed to distinguish
only between target trials (class 1) and nontarget trials (class 2).
They have either limited or no capability to reject spoofing im-
postor trials (class 3), which may closely resemble target tri-
als. In this sense, the ASV system can only discriminate be-
tween target trials (classes 1 and 3) and nontarget trials (2).
In contrast, CM systems are designed to distinguish bona fide
speech (classes 1 and 2) from spoofed speech (3). Herein lies
the need for three classes, which stems from the different, com-
plementary actions of separate CM and ASV systems.
While previous work has shown the potential to combine
the action of CM and ASV systems in the form of a single sys-
tem [10], separating CM and ASV systems has the potential for
the explicit detection of spoofing attacks. The paper considers
three such architectures illustrated in Fig. 1 and described in
further detail below. First, we formalise the specific functions
of the ASV and CM systems.
2.2. ASV and CM systems
The ASV system operates on a pair of speech utterances, X =
(Xtrain,Xtest) where Xtrain is a training, or enrollment utterance
associated with a known speaker identity and where Xtest is the
test or trial utterance. Utterances can be presented as raw wave-
forms, sequences of spectral features, i-vectors, Gaussian mix-
ture models or other similar descriptors. The ASV system out-
puts a detection score (often, a log-likelihood ratio), denoted
here by r ∈ R, associated with the strength of two opposing hy-
potheses, namely the target (null) hypothesis (utterances Xtrain
and Xtest were produced by the same speaker) and the nontarget
(alternative) hypothesis (different speakers). Higher score val-
ues indicate stronger support for the target hypothesis. Hard de-
cisions are made upon the comparison of scores r to a threshold
t: if r > t, then the target hypothesis is accepted. Otherwise,
the nontarget hypothesis is accepted.
The CM operates in a similar manner, but with different
models and hypotheses. Whereas the ASV system requires the
learning of one model per speaker, CMs generally require the
learning of only two models. Extending the previous notation
X = (Xtrain,Xtest), Xtrain now consists of a (potentially very
large) set of utterances corresponding to either bona fide or
spoofed speech, whereas Xtest still represents a single test or
trial. The hypotheses are now that the trial corresponds to either
a bona fide (null) hypothesis or spoofed (alternative) hypothe-
sis. The CM output score, denoted by q ∈ R, is now interpreted
as the support for the bona fide hypothesis. Hard CM deci-
sions are then made upon the comparison of q to a CM-specific
threshold s: if q > s then the bona fide hypothesis is accepted.
Otherwise, the spoofed hypothesis is accepted.
2.3. System combination
The different ways in which separate ASV and CM systems can
be combined is illustrated in Fig. 1. They encompass either cas-
caded or parallel combinations [7]. ASV and CM systems can
be cascaded in either order. In this case the CM acts as a gate
and will reject immediately trials which are detected as spoof-
ing attacks, saving redundant processing by ASV. Likewise, the
ASV could act as a gate, saving redundant processing by the
CM. Alternatively, ASV and CM systems can work in parallel
whereby trials are only accepted upon the positive decisions of
both sub-systems.
The work presented in this paper provides a means of as-
sessing the reliability of such combined systems, whatever the
approach to combination. The combined system selects an ac-
tion α = (αcm, αasv) ∈ A × A from the set of possible joint
actions of the two detectors. Here, an action implies a hard
classification decision, each of which is associated a cost which
incurred if the decision is incorrect. For a given trial, each sys-
tems (ASV and CM) selects one of the actions from the set:
A = {ACCEPT,REJECT,SLEEP}
where the ‘dummy’ SLEEP action indicates a trial that, as a
result of cascaded combination, is not processed by the ASV or
CM sub-systems. Given the set of joint actions, A × A, there
are nine possible action pairs. It is evident from Fig. 1, though,
that six action pairs are sufficient to describe the cascaded and
parallel combinations:
α1 = (ACCEPT , REJECT)
α2 = (ACCEPT , ACCEPT)
α3 = (REJECT , REJECT)
α4 = (REJECT , ACCEPT)
α5 = (REJECT , SLEEP)
α6 = (SLEEP , REJECT),
the last two of which are specific to cascaded configurations.
These same six action pairs are illustrated in Table 1 with the
errors that may result from each. Action pair α2 is the only pair
that may lead to false acceptance errors. The others may lead to
false rejection errors (misses). These error rates constitute the
basic elements for computing the detection cost which is the
subject of the next section.
The tandem detection cost function (t-DCF) proposed in
this paper is a single scalar that reflects the reliability of de-
cisions made by the combined ASV and CM system. It is based
upon the combination of detection error rates for the individual
systems, taking into account the action αi assigned to a repre-
sentative number of different trial types (see Table 1). Before
describing the t-DCF metric, we review the standard detection
cost function and its application to ASV and CM systems on
their own.
3. ASV and CM error rates
The basic set-up is as follows. As evaluators, we are given a
combined system S = (ASV,CM) composed of a pair of ASV
and CM systems combined using one of the three approaches
illustrated in Fig. 1. We do not have access to the systems them-
selves — only their output scores (ri, qi) ∈ R2, i = 1, 2 . . . , N
in response to a set of N evaluation trials defined by us. We
have a total of Ntar target, Nnon nontarget and Nspoof spoof tri-
als. They are mutually exclusive, so N = Ntar +Nnon +Nspoof.
Even if we use the paired notation (ri, qi), we compute the er-
rors related to ASV and CM independently of each other. Thus,
in principle, the ASV scores {ri} and the CM scores {qi} could
originate from a different set of evaluation trials (though usually
we use the same test files).
For generality, in the following subsections, we write the
detection error rates of each system as functions of their respec-
tive detection thresholds (t for ASV, s for CM), even if one has
to fix them in an actual authentication application.
3.1. Detection error rates of ASV
We are now in a position to define the miss (or false rejection)
rate and the false alarm (or false acceptance) rate of the ASV
system at threshold t:
P asvmiss(t) ,
∫ t
−∞
p(r|tar) dr ≈ 1
Ntar
∑
i∈Λtar
I{ri ≤ t}
P asvfa (t) ,
∫ ∞
t
p(r|non) dr ≈ 1
Nnon
∑
i∈Λnon
I{ri > t},
(1)
where p(r|·) denotes the underlying continuous class-
conditional score density, and where ≈ signifies that we esti-
mate the error rates from a finite sample by counting, using the
sums shown at the end of each equation. Here, I is an indica-
tor function, while Λtar and Λnon index the target and nontarget
trials. The miss rate is the proportion of target trials that were
falsely rejected, and the false alarm rate is the proportion of
nontarget trials that were falsely accepted.
The casual reader might be puzzled why we define the false
alarm rate considering nontargets only, rather than the pooled
(mixture) distribution of nontarget and spoof scores — after all,
are those not the ones whose false acceptances we are concerned
with? The reason, as mentioned earlier, is that the spoof sam-
ples in fact resemble much more the target samples than nontar-
get samples: they should be treated as having score distribution
characteristics more similar to p(r|tar) than p(r|non); if this
actually was not the case, one could say that the spoofed test
samples are not very interesting ones, as the unprotected ASV
system would reject them, and we are back to the conventional
ASV set-ups.
In a worst case attack scenario with extremely high qual-
ity spoofing attacks2, we set p(r|spoof) = p(r|tar). In this case
the miss rate of the ASV system of the genuine target speakers is
the same as the miss rate of the spoof tests. As an example, con-
sider a high-accuracy ASV system with target speaker miss rate
of 1%. Under the worst-case assumption, this is also the miss
rate of the spoof tests (“ASV did not miss the spoof sample”)
— implying that 99% of the spoofs were, in fact, accepted by
the ASV system as target trials. The validity of the worst-case
assumption depends both on the ASV system and the evaluation
corpus.
One benefit of the worst-case assumption is simplicity: our
proposed tandem DCF can be computed using the ‘traditional’
miss and false alarm rates alone — that is, the ASV system itself
does not need to be tested with the spoof trials.When the worst
case assumption does not hold, we measure the empirical miss
2Such as artificial speech attacks produced by state-of-the-art speech
synthesis, or high-end loudspeaker anechoic room replay attacks that
the authors introduced in the ASVspoof 2017 challenge.
rate of spoof trials against the ASV system. Specifically, we
compute the probability of the event that a spoof test was not
missed by the ASV system, as 1− P asvmiss,spoof, where
P asvmiss,spoof(t) ,
∫ t
−∞
p(r|spoof) dr
≈ 1
Nspoof
∑
i∈Λspoof
I{ri ≤ t},
(2)
and where Λspoof indexes the spoof trials. Hence, (2) counts the
fraction of spoofing trials below the detection threshold — that
is, the fraction of spoofing trials that were correctly rejected.
Then, the ‘not missed’ case, 1 − P asvmiss,spoof(t), counts the pro-
portion of spoofing trials that were falsely accepted by the ASV.
Note that we treat the spoofs as the positive class — spoof trials
replace the target speaker trials when computing ASV-specific
detection error rates — and therefore we have to define the false
acceptance rate of spoofs as the opposite of missing them; false
acceptance rate is undefined for a positive class.
3.2. Detection error rates of CM
The task of a CM is to differentiate human samples from spoofs.
In this respect, the targets and nontargets are taken to be in one
positive ‘human’ class of bona fide speech while the spoofs rep-
resent the negative class. We assume p(q|hum) = p(q|tar) =
p(q|non), where q denotes the countermeasure score and ‘hum’
stands for human. Therefore,
P cmmiss(s) ,
∫ s
−∞
p(q|hum) dq ≈ 1
Nhum
∑
j∈Λhum
I{qj ≤ s}
P cmfa (s) ,
∫ ∞
s
p(q|spoof) dq ≈ 1
Nspoof
∑
j∈Λspoof
I{qj > s},
(3)
where Λhum = Λtar ∪ Λnon indices the human trials, Λspoof in-
dices the spoof trials, and Nhum = Ntar +Nnon.
3.3. Equal error rate (EER)
Since the miss and false alarm rates of a given system are, re-
spectively, increasing and decreasing functions of the detection
threshold, there exists a unique error rate at which the two equal
each other. This is the well-known equal error rate (EER).
Technically, for a finite detection score set, the EER does not
exist. It may nonetheless be estimated using interpolation tech-
niques; we point the interested reader to [11, p. 85] for further
details.
4. Detection costs: background
4.1. Bayes minimum risk
In Bayes’ minimum risk classification, one makes predictions
of the class label and picks a class that leads to the least risky
choice. Consider an action set, denoted A = {α1, . . . , αL},
which represents the decisions made by a classification system.
Further, a proposition set, Θ = {θ1, . . . , θM} represents the
actual states of nature (ground truth or class label). Note that L
and M do not have to be equal. Selecting an action α ∈ A has
a consequence. We assign a nonnegative cost C(α|θ) ∈ R+
on taking action α when the proposition θ ∈ Θ is actually true.
For correct actions we assign a cost of 0 without loss of general-
ity. In our context, the action means taking a decision (choosing
the ASV and CM actions) for a single test trial, and the propo-
sition, or class label, contains the actual type of the user in that
trial. The cost can be thought as a class-specific unit cost for a
mistake made by the classification system; such as an amount
of money that a bank loses if a legitimate customer is rejected,
or an intruder is accepted, with possibly much higher cost for
the latter. The evaluator chooses these costs before obtaining
any ASV or CM detection scores.
Consider some fixed operating point(s) and let Perr(θ) de-
note the class-conditional error probability of a given detection
system for class θ. The detection system could be either ASV,
CM or one of the combined systems in Fig. 1. In the case of
standalone systems, Perr(θ) would be one of the miss or false
alarm rates discussed in the previous sections; in the case of the
combined systems, computation of Perr(θ) involves combining
error probabilities from the two systems that will be detailed be-
low. Now, since Perr(θ) just counts the (normalized) errors for
class θ, each one of which has a unit cost C(α|θ) upon taking
action α, the total accumulated cost is simply C(α|θ)Perr(θ).
The last ingredient in completing the basic DCF formula-
tion is to choose a prior, pi ∈ PM , over the propositions. Here
pii = P (θi) and PM , {(pi1, . . . , piM )|pii ≥ 0, ∑i pii = 1}
is a probability simplex. The prior sets one’s expectation of how
often each one of the propositions is true (i.e. how frequent the
target and nontarget users might be). The priors can, but do not
have to, match the empirical trial proportions in the evaluation
corpus. The system vendor does not have access to the true
proportions.
Under the previous assumptions, the expected (or average)
cost for taking a specific action α is
DCF(αj) =
M∑
i=1
piiC(αj |θi)Perr(αj |θi). (4)
The total expected cost, that we will refer to as the detection
cost function (DCF) is then the total cost obtained by summing
the action-specific costs
DCF =
L∑
j=1
DCF(αj) =
L∑
j=1
M∑
i=1
piiC(αj |θi)Perr(αj |θi).
(5)
Note that the error Perr(αj |θi), which could be a miss or
false acceptance, depends on the action and the correct class.
4.2. NIST DCF
In the conventional ASV without spoofing considerations, we
have target and nontarget trials and our ASV system either ac-
cepts or rejects the user. Therefore we have Θ = {θtar,θnon}
andA = {ACCEPT,REJECT} and, coincidentally, |Θ| = |A|.
Choosing the decision regions (in our case, setting the ASV de-
cision threshold t in a 1-dimensional detection score space) de-
fines the actions of the classifier. In specific, REJECT action
corresponds to the region [−∞, t] and its complement ACCEPT
corresponds to the region [t,∞]. Therefore, the conditional er-
ror probabilities at operating point t are Perr(REJECT|θtar) =
P (r ≤ t|θtar) = P asvmiss(t) and Perr(ACCEPT|θnon) = P (r >
t|θnon) = P asvfa (t). Since we have only two types of trial users,
it is sufficient to specify only the target prior pitar; the nontarget
prior is then pinon = 1−pitar. Further, let us use more convenient
notations Cmiss = C(REJECT|θtar), Cfa = C(ACCEPT|θnon) to
denote the two costs. Substituting all these ingredients into (5)
gives finally the more familiar DCF form used extensively in
the technology benchmarks coordinated by National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [9]:
DCF(t) = CmisspitarP asvmiss(t) + Cfa(1− pitar)P asvfa (t), (6)
which we will refer to as the NIST DCF. Once we fix the DCF
parameters (Cmiss, Cfa, pitar) and the operating point (threshold)
t, the DCF provides a single number that measures the per-
formance of the evaluated ASV system in the sense explained
above. Choosing the cost parameters defines an application [8]
of interest. We note also that even if the above cost has three
parameters, they can be collapsed into a single cost parameter
known as the effective prior [11, p. 75] without loss of general-
ity regarding ranking of system performance.
5. Proposed t-DCF
With the relevant theory background covered above, it is now
straightforward to extend the NIST DCF to evaluation scenarios
that involve spoofing. Now the action set A = {α1, . . . ,α6}
consists of the six possible (ASV, CM) joint actions defined
in subsection 2.3, while the proposition set expands to Θ =
{θtar, θnon, θspoof} with a prior (pitar, pinon, pispoof) ∈ P3. Note that
now |Θ| 6= |A|. As for the detection costs, since we have two
detection systems, each with two possible outcomes3 , we spec-
ify four costs:
• Casvmiss – cost of ASV system rejecting a target trial.
• Casvfa – cost of ASV system accepting a nontarget trial.
• Ccmmiss – cost of CM rejecting a human trial.
• Ccmfa – cost of CM accepting a spoof trial.
What now remains is detailing the computation of the error
probabilities. Since the ASV and CM systems work in unison,
we must take into account both of their errors. We treat the two
systems as being independent and find the joint probability of an
event by multiplying the relevant error probabilities of each sys-
tem. Our formalism is general but for brevity, we focus on the
cascaded configuration (i) of Fig. 1. Referring to Table 1, there
are four possible errors in total, labeled (a), (b), (c) and (d).
The error probabilities are functions of the detection thresholds
of the two systems, s for the CM and t for the ASV module.
(a) CM correctly passes on target speaker utterance to the
ASV system, which however misses it, causing a false
rejection; the probability for this event is,
Pa(s, t) , (1− P cmmiss(s))× P asvmiss(t),
read as “CM does not miss human speech, and ASV
falsely rejects the target.”
(b) CM passes on a nontarget which gets accepted by ASV,
causing false acceptance; the probability,
Pb(s, t) , (1− P cmmiss(s))× P asvfa (t),
is read as “CM does not miss human speech, and ASV
falsely accepts the nontarget”.
(c) CM falsely passes on a spoof sample which gets falsely
accepted by the ASV system. The probability is,
Pc(s, t) , P cmfa (s)× (1− P asvmiss,spoof(t))
read as “CM falsely passes on a spoof sample, and ASV
does not miss the target” (we refer the reader back to
3The third dummy action, SLEEP, is dictated by the other decisions.
subsection 3.1). The miss rate P asvmiss,spoof(t) can be evalu-
ated empirically using (2) or, in the worst-case spoofing
attack scenario, be fixed to the target miss rate P asvmiss(t)
defined in (1).
(d) CM falsely rejects target speaker utterance as a spoof;
the probability is
Pd(s) = P
cm
miss(s)
read as “countermeasure misses human speech.”
Remark. It is worth noticing that the miss rate Pd(s) is made
up of two separate error terms:
P cmmiss(s)× P asvmiss(t)
and
P cmmiss(s)× (1− P asvmiss(t))
that correspond to the (REJECT, REJECT) and (REJECT,
ACCEPT) actions, respectively, as shown in Table 1. The miss
rate P asvmiss(t) of the ASV system is canceled out when the two
error terms are summed to form Pd(s).
We now have all the ingredients defined for our proposal:
Tandem detection cost function (t-DCF)
t-DCF(s, t) = Casvmiss · pitar · Pa(s, t)
+ Casvfa · pinon · Pb(s, t)
+ Ccmfa · pispoof · Pc(s, t)
+ Ccmmiss · pitar · Pd(s).
(7)
5.1. Properties of t-DCF
Let us now observe how the t-DCF behaves in a few interesting
special cases. For brevity we focus on the CM-ASV tandem
system (i) of Fig. 1. We assume the worst-case spoofing sce-
nario with identical target and spoof ASV score distributions.
An ASV system without any countermeasure. First, con-
sider a regular, unprotected ASV system. This is equivalent to
placing a ‘dummy’ countermeasure that passes on every speech
utterance to the ASV back-end, with threshold s = −∞ leading
to P cmmiss(s) = 0 and P
cm
fa (s) = 1. Thus
t-DCFACCEPT-ALL(t) = Casvmiss · pitar · P asvmiss(t)
+ Casvfa · pinon · P asvfa (t)
+ Ccmfa · pispoof · (1− P asvmiss(t))
The first two terms are the errors of the ASV system. The
only error contribution of the CM is in the last term which corre-
sponds to passing a spoofed sample to the ASV, which does not
miss it. If one further assumes that there are no spoofing attacks
(pispoof = 0), then the t-DCF collapses to the NIST DCF (6).
Thus, the t-DCF can be interpreted as a generalization of NIST
DCF to scenarios that involve spoofing attacks with a tandem
ASV-CM system designed to cope with all three types of trials.
A countermeasure that rejects every input sample. As
another extreme case, consider a countermeasure that rejects ev-
ery sample before passing it to the ASV system. Now s = ∞,
P cmmiss(s) = 1 and P
cm
fa (s) = 0, leading to
t-DCFREJECT-ALL = Ccmmisspitar
Now, the t-DCF is constant in that it does not depend on the
ASV system; this is reasonable since the ASV system was never
invoked.
The perfect countermeasure. The perfect countermeasure
system with an EER of 0% has P cmmiss = P
cm
fa = 0. The last two
terms of (7) are zero, thereby giving
t-DCFIDEAL-CM(t) = Casvmiss · pitar ·P asvmiss(t) +Casvfa · pinon ·P asvfa (t).
Notice that in (6) we have (1−pitar) = pinon, in which case the t-
DCF would be an exact match to the NIST DCF. The difference
is that the priors do not sum up to one since the complete space
we started with had a non-zero probability associated with spoof
trials.
The perfect ASV. Similar to above, consider an ASV sys-
tem with both detection errors being zero. In this case, the tDCF
becomes
t-DCFIDEAL-ASV(s) = Ccmmiss · pitar · P cmmiss(s)
+ Ccmfa · pispoof · P cmfa (s),
which has the same form as the NIST DCF, except that the eval-
uated system and the costs and priors are those of the CM, not
the ASV system. To conclude the two previous special cases,
whenever one of the detectors makes no classification errors,
the t-DCF counts the errors of the remaining system.
5.2. Choosing t-DCF parameters (choosing the application)
Now, how should one set the parameters of the t-DCF? Even
if the t-DCF formulation applies, in principle, to the evaluation
of arbitrary scenarios including surveillance and forensic use
cases, this paper considers authentication to which the problem
of spoofing is relevant.
In answering this question, we consider a hypothetical
‘banking’ scenario. This is a mere example to help illustrate
the concepts, rather than a real-world banking scenario based
on empirical data. The use of an example is necessary; there is
no way to determine the actual frequency of spoofing attacks
(if one could really detect and count them, why should one
care about spoofing research in the first place?). The best one
can do is to assert a spoofing prior and other cost parameters
some arbitrary but reasonable values. In a banking application,
pinon  pitar and pispoof  pitar might be fairly reasonable as-
sumptions, i.e., a bank might process hundreds of thousands of
transactions daily, most of which contain a legitimate, bona fide
user accessing his or her own phone/e-bank account.
It is of interest to fix as many of the parameters as possi-
ble while varying other, more interesting parameters. To this
end, the primary variable of interest is the prior of the spoof-
ing attack, pispoof. After asserting pispoof (for instance 0.001),
pitar = (1 − pispoof) × 0.99 and pinon = (1 − pispoof) × 0.01
are fixed; the priors sum to 1. The multipliers 0.99 and 0.01 are
arbitrary but representative of a banking application with a high
target speaker prior and a low nontarget prior. As for the cost
parametersCasvfa ,C
asv
miss,C
cm
fa , andC
cm
miss, it is of interest to express
these as a ratio since this reflects the desired balance between
miss and false alarm rates. The rejection of bona fide users
should incur a cost that reflects user inconvenience. The accep-
tance of zero-effort impostors and spoofing impostors should
incur a higher cost: this reflects losses to the bank incurred as a
result of granting fraudsters access to customer bank accounts.
These are competing requirement, however, implying a reason-
able balance between the cost ratios. Similar to the typical NIST
SREs, we set Casvfa /C
asv
miss = 10 and C
cm
fa /C
cm
miss = 10. In prac-
tice, we set Casvfa = C
cm
fa = 10 and C
asv
miss = C
cm
miss = 1.
Table 2: Number of trials in the ASVspoof 2015 and ASVspoof
2017 evaluation protocols for ASV experiments.
Trial Type ASVspoof 2015 ASVspoof 2017
Target 4053 1106
Nontarget 77007 18624
Spoof 80000 10878
6. Experimental set-up
6.1. ASVspoof 2015 and 2017 corpora
The two ASV Spoofing and Countermeasures (ASVspoof) cor-
pora originate from the challenges held in 2015 and 2017.
The 2015 evaluation focused on the detection of synthetic
speech (SS) and voice conversion (VC) whereas the 2017 edi-
tion focused on the detection of replay attacks. The data-related
details of both corpora are reported elsewhere [12, 13]; the fo-
cus here is on aspects relevant to evaluation.
Participants in both challenges were provided with labeled
training and development data, and were asked to submit CM
scores {qj} for a set of unlabeled evaluation trials. The per-
formance of submitted countermeasures was then ranked using
an EER metric4. The 2015 evaluation data contains 9,404 bona
fide trials and 184,000 spoofed trials, with the latter compris-
ing 10 different SS and VC attacks (5 known and 5 unknown).
The 2017 evaluation data contains 1,298 bona fide and 12,008
spoofed trials comprising diverse replay attacks collected from
161 replay sessions (collected in 57 distinct configurations). For
the 2015 data, we select the male ASV trials. For the 2017 data,
we exclude replay segments that lack a corresponding speaker
enrollment in the original RedDots source corpus. A summary
of trial statistics for the 2015 and 2017 evaluation partitions is
presented in Table 2.
While the focus of the evaluation itself was on the develop-
ment of spoofing CMs, both corpora are accompanied with pro-
tocols for ASV assessment. These have been used previously
in order to gauge ASV vulnerabilities to each form of spoofing
attack (and hence to demonstrate the need for spoofing CMs).
Table 2 illustrates the number of genuine trials, zero-effort im-
postor and spoofing attack trials for the respective evaluation
partitions. Note that the ASVspoof 2015 speech corpus is used
for text-independent ASV task with short utterances whlile the
ASVspoof 2017 was for text-dependent scenario.
6.2. ASV systems
All ASV experiments are performed with a common Gaus-
sian mixture model - universal background model (GMM-
UBM) [14] framework using a Mel-frequency cepstral coef-
ficient (MFCC) front-end. Pre-emphasized speech is processed
with 20 ms frames every 10 ms. The power spectrum is obtained
using a windowed discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to obtain
19 static MFCCs (excluding the 0-th coefficient) extracted us-
ing the discrete cosine transform (DCT) of 20 log-power, Mel-
scaled filterbank outputs. RASTA filtering is applied before
delta and delta-delta computation, resulting in 57 features per
frame. Energy-based speech activity detection (SAD) is ap-
plied in order to discard non-speech frames. Cepstral mean
and variance normalization (CMVN) is the applied at the utter-
4An average EER computed across individual tasks was used in
2015, whereas a pooled EER was used in 2017.
ance level. For ASVspoof 2015, we retain the energy coefficient
and skip both SAD and CMVN. The UBM has 512 Gaussians
and is trained using the TIMIT corpus5 using an expectation-
maximization algorithm. Speaker models are obtained through
maximum a posteriori adaptation.
7. Results
Reported here are results for the top-10 performing submissions
to the two ASVspoof challenges assessed using both the default
EER metric and the t-DCF metric proposed in this paper. We
keep our ASV system fixed and compare the performance of
the different CMs. Specifically, we carry out linear calibration
of the ASV scores following the ASV-specific parameters pitar,
Casvfa , C
asv
miss, and threshold the ASV scores at t = 0 to obtain the
ASV miss and false alarm rates. We then report the minimum
t-DCF of a given CM system by mins{t-DCF(s, t = 0)}, by
sweeping the CM threshold to find the minimum achievable t-
DCF of that system.
Results are illustrated in Table 3 for ASVspoof 2015 (left)
and ASVspoof 2017 (right). Systems are ranked according to
EER-derived results presented in the second column of each
half of the table. t-DCF-derived results appear in columns 3, 4
and 5 for spoofing attack priors pispoof =0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 re-
spectively. In addition, the first two rows show the special cases
of the traditional, unprotected ASV system and the perfect CM
for reference purposes. The former is to show the general im-
provement when the CM module is combined with ASV, while
the latter indicates the best achievable performance for the ASV
system.
As expected, all the CMs for both corpora provide a sub-
stantial boost over the no CM case. While for low values
of pispoof there is little to choose between the performance of
each system, differences are more pronounced for higher pri-
ors. There are also differences in ranking, had this been been
performed according to the t-DCF, instead of the EER. For
ASVspoof 2015, system B is the best performing no matter
what the prior. System S01 remains the best performing for
ASVspoof 2017, even if ranking differences are still observed
elsewhere. Finally, there is also a clear margin between the
obtained t-DCF scores and the best achievable results (perfect
CM). For the ASVspoof 2015 data, the best system (B) how-
ever gets very close (0.1661) to the optimum one (0.1660) for
the lowest spoof prior.
Ranking differences serve to show the importance of as-
sessing CM performance, not in isolation, but combined with
ASV. These findings support the adoption of the t-DCF into the
roadmap for future ASVspoof challenges. It is stressed, how-
ever, that these same findings do not prevent the challenge from
focusing on the development of CMs in isolation. If accom-
panied with a set of ASV scores and aligned protocols, future
challenges could still focus exclusively on the development of
CMs since the proposed t-DCF metric then allows optimisation
to be performed in a manner that reflects their impact on the
performance of CMs when combined with ASV.
8. Conclusions
This paper proposes an elegant solution to the assessment of
combined spoofing countermeasures and automatic speaker ver-
ification. The tandem decision cost function (t-DCF) draws
upon established best practice in assessing the reliability of bio-
5https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/LDC93S1
Table 3: t-DCF values of joint evaluation of ASV and CM using different values of pispoof for top-10 systems of ASVspoof 2015 and
ASVspoof 2017.
ASVspoof 2015 ASVspoof 2017
t-DCF for pispoof = t-DCF for pispoof =
System EER 0.001 0.01 0.05 System EER 0.001 0.01 0.05
no CM - 0.1709 0.2146 0.4061 no CM - 0.0307 0.1016 0.4169
perfect CM 0.00 0.1660 0.1653 0.1601 perfect CM 0.00 0.0228 0.0227 0.0217
A 1.57 0.1665 0.1696 0.1735 S01 6.92 0.0277 0.0646 0.1126
B 2.55 0.1661 0.1670 0.1684 S02 12.41 0.0305 0.0984 0.1847
D 3.65 0.1662 0.1677 0.1718 S03 14.28 0.0302 0.0955 0.2066
C 4.87 0.1665 0.1704 0.1825 S04 14.87 0.0302 0.0951 0.2123
I 4.97 0.1662 0.1681 0.1738 S05 16.54 0.0306 0.1005 0.2310
E 5.50 0.1664 0.1701 0.1828 S06 17.96 0.0291 0.0856 0.2429
F 6.08 0.1670 0.1717 0.1873 S08 18.09 0.0297 0.0910 0.2423
G 6.12 0.1667 0.1711 0.1859 S07 18.67 0.0303 0.0928 0.2271
H 6.64 0.1669 0.1730 0.1912 S09 20.19 0.0304 0.0982 0.2194
J 7.83 0.1664 0.1702 0.1846 S10 21.17 0.0300 0.0914 0.2554
metric systems in a Bayes/minimum risk sense, by combining
a fixed cost model with trial priors. Together, they reflect the
practical consequences of decision errors in realistic use case
scenarios in which biometric systems may face bona fide users,
casual/zero-effort impostors, or fraudsters seeking to spoof the
system by manipulating the decisions it makes. The t-DCF gen-
eralises to situations without CMs, those with overly aggressive
CMs in addition to the consideration of ASV and CM systems
that make no errors and has application to the study of any bio-
metric. It is also agnostic to the particular approach by which
a biometric system and CM is combined. Example assessments
using the proposed t-DCF are reported for automatic speaker
recognition within the context of two ASVspoof challenges.
Differences in CM rankings observed using the t-DCF metric
advocate its adoption into the roadmap for future ASVspoof
challenges, in addition to the assessment of biometric spoofing
and countermeasures generally.
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